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COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF PEMBERTON V. HUGHES
By FOWLER VINCENT HARPER*
PEMBERTON V. HUGHES

N Pemberton v. Hughes,' the action was brought in England, by
one Sarah E. Pemberton claiming to be the widow of Francis
Alexander Pemberton, for certain property rights incident to widowhood. Whether plaintiff was the widow of Pemberton depended
upon the validity of their alleged marriage, which in turn depended
upon the validity of a Florida divorce of the lady from a former
husband. In the divorce action in question, service of summons had
been made upon the present plaintiff one day less than the statutory period before appearance. Under the law of Florida, such a
defective service rendered the decree void and subject to collateral
attack. Nevertheless it was held that no collateral attack could be
maintained in England.
The American Law Institute has incorporated the doctrine of
Pemberton v. Hughes into its Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
Section 474 of the Tentative Restatement provides as follows:
"A valid foreign judgment will not be denied recognition because
the procedural lav of the state where the judgment was rendered
was violated in the proceedings before judgment."
This is the black-letter type of the Restatement and it is sup2
posed to formulate the doctrine of Pemberton v. Hughes, supra.
The comment to section 474 is as follows:
*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1[1899] I Ch. 781.
2
See Explanatory Notes, Conflict of Laws Restatement, sec. 474.
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"The statement in this section is applicable though the procedural
defect would have led the court of the state where it was rendered,
dealing collaterally with its validity, to treat it as void; though in
such a case recognition is not required by the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution of the United States."
The example presented in the Restatement to illustrate both the
black-letter rule and the comment is as follows:
"A suit for divorce in state X is entered in court one day earlier
than the local procedural law permitted. Judgment is given, divorcinig A from B. This judgment would have been regarded as null
if introduced collaterally in X. A proper exemplification of the
judgment is introduced in a suit in state Y between the same parties.
The court will recognize it as valid judgment."
Tna

LoGIc oV THZ SITUATION

The logic of the result in Pemberton v. Hughes, as articulated
in the orthodox formulae of the law, presents a hopeless tangle. A
judgment is "invalid" at home but "valid" abroad. It is subject to
collateral attack where rendered, but immune from such attack elsewhere. Courts in Florida will refuse to accord it any legal effect
whatever but courts in every other common law jurisdiction will
accord it complete and conclusive effect. There is no judgment at
all in Florida, but as soon as the state line is crossed, there is a
valid subsisting and binding obligation which is not open to impeachment.
Let us assume a hypothetical case to put the doctrine to the
extreme test of common sense. Indiana has the identical rule with
respect to insufficient lapse of time between the service and the decree in divorce proceedings, the only difference being that in Indiana
sixty days are required instead of ten days 3 A decree rendered
short of sixty days is by statute declared null and void. Now suppose the Pemberton v. Hughes problem arose in an Indiana court
instead of in an English tribunal. The Restatement, following the
English decision, advises us that the Indiana court will recognize
the Florida decree. If such a decree had been rendered in Indiana,
it would not be recognized in that state. The decree in question is
not recognized in Florida where it was rendered. But the Florida
SBurns, Indiana Statutes, 1926, sec.

11O4.
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decree is valid and conclusive in Indiana and, by the same rule, a
similar divorce rendered in Indiana where it is void will be recognized in Florida.
Again, suppose the same parties who were divorced in Florida
under the defective service are subsequently divorced in Indiana
under a similarly defective service. Suppose thereafter the husband
dies, leaving property both in Indiana and in Florida. The wife
could claim no property interest in Indiana incident to widowhood-not because of the Indiana divorce which is null, but by
reason of the Florida divorce which is null in Florida for a similar
reason. She could not claim such rights in the Florida propertynot because of the local decree which is null, but by reason of the
Indiana divorce which is null in Indiana. The mere recital of such
anomalous results demonstrates the extraordinary character of the
rule. A situation so odd certainly requires close scrutiny from every
point of view before it is accepted as sound law. While the role
of mathematical logic is frequently unimportant as a final test of
the soundness of legal rules, it is always a convenient instrument
for first analysis. To be sure, the last and final standard to which
legal rules must conform is that of social utility and desirability.
It is not to be forgotten, however, that the logical coherence of a
body of legal rules, consistent with the ordinary dictates of common
sense, has an important bearing upon social utility. This is particularly true in the conflict of laws where it not infrequently happens
that accurate predictability and certainty are of first importance.'
SociAL POLICY INVOLVED'
It can not be argued with much force that any great principle
of social policy is violated in looking behind the formal certification
or authentication of a sister state judgment by that state's "official"
representatives. There is nothing added to the binding effect of a
foreign judgment by the fact of authentication by the proper officials of the sister state. The Act of Congress requires that such
foreign records and proceedings shall be "proved or admitted in any
other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk,
and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with
a certificate of the judge, chief justice or presiding magistrate, that
4See CARrzo, PARAoxzS ov LwAx, ScraNct, p. 67.
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the said attestation is in due form."'5 Accordingly, the clerk certifies that the papers constitute "a true copy," or "a true and perfect copy of the record," or some similar phrase, and the judge
certifies that the attestation is in due form of law, and, frequently,
that the clerk was duly authorized to act as clerk. This is uniformly
held to be a sufficient authentication of the foreign proceedings. The
added certificate of the Secretary of State or similar officer that the
clerk and judge were duly elected or duly authorized officers adds
nothing more to the legal or logical effect of the transcript. Such
authentication, at best, is merely evidence, albeit conclusive, that such
a record exists in the foreign state. It is not conclusive evidence
that such judgment or decree is "valid" or "binding" on the parties,
or that it has any legal consequences whatever. It raises only the
usual rebuttable presumption.
The conflict of laws serves a tremendous social interest in the
development of dogmas designed to make uniform legal relationships
and their attendant rights and duties. 6 It is highly inconvenient to
countenance conditions which result in legal relationships varying
with geography. Consequently when a judgment is rendered in one
common law jurisdiction, it is only for compelling reasons that
judgment will not be accorded the same effect as creating the right
to have the judgment obeyed in other jurisdictions. The full faith
and credit clause is significant testimony to the importance of this
social interest. The same interest, of course, is involved in according more effect in other jurisdictions than is accorded a judgment
where it is rendered. Consequently when a judgment is rendered
by a court of one state under circumstances that make that judgment subject to attack whenever and however it is relied upon as a
determination of the rights of the parties, the primary' function of
the conflict of laws requires the same result in every sister state.
Otherwise the substantial rights of the parties vary with state lines.
The policy which prompts legal rules, such as that in Florida
governing a failure to observe the statutory period between the
service of summons and the decree, deserves some mention. It is
submitted that that policy is entitled to some consideration for it has
11U. S. C. A., tit. 28, sec. 687.
6

See Goodrich. "Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 36 W. VA. L.

Q. is6

(m93o).
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behind it deep-seated moral convictions which it can hardly be said
are foreign to or opposed to the general and prevailing view in other
common law jurisdictions. That moral conviction, whether wise or
not, is the belief that divorce is an evil and that it should be discouraged, and that when one or both spouses have decided to terminate the marital relation, a given period of time should be required
before the decision can be carried into effect. That time may result
in a reconciliation of the two or repentance by the one or the other
that will avoid the divorce. Indiana believes that it is desirable to
require sixty days to elapse before a decree can be rendered. A
decree rendered within the period is declared by the legislature to be
"null and void." Thus while it is doubtless true that most errors
in "procedure" do not render the court incompetent to "hear and determine," it is not an unreasonable exception to regard the length
of time between the summons and a divorce decree as jurisdictional,
and the policy behind such exception is easily comprehensible. 7
As to the expediency, convenience, or propriety of a court in
which a foreign judgment is introduced going behind the record to
see what effect the law of the state where it was rendered attaches
to it, it is submitted that there is nothing surprising in the practice whatever. Such investigation is a regular incident of common
law technique. In the fraud cases, courts do not hesitate to look
into the rulings and decisions of the state where the judgment in
question was rendered to determine whether such a judgment may
be collaterally attacked for the fraud.' If it appears that such an
attack might be made in the state where the judgment was rendered,
as revealed by the cases in that state, such an attack will be sustained
at the forum.9 So also as to the effect in a foreign state of a judgment barring recovery under the statute of limitations; '1 or the
effect of a foreign decree against a corporation upon stockholders
not parties to the action ;11 or the question of what matters are
7
1t is to be noted that the public policy of England did not in any way
forbid the recognition of the defect in the Florida proceedings. The English
court, therefore, defeated the effects desired by Florida public policy with no
compensatory promotion of local policy.
8

Ball v. Warrington, io8 Fed. 472 (i9oi).
93 FRMAN ON JuDGMXNTs 5th ed., sec. 1401.
10

Brand v. Brand, ii6 Ky. 785, 76 S.W. 868.
23Calloway v. Glenn, io5 Ky. 648, 49 S.W. 44o.
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barred under the doctrine of res judicata by a foreign judgment.12
There is, therefore, nothing surprising in expecting a court where *a
foreign divorce decree is introduced to look to the law of the state
where such decree was rendered to discover what effect will be accorded to any alleged defects in the proceedings before judgment.
WHAT AcTuALY HAPpZNS-BASIS

FOR PREzDICTION

The ordinary set-up of a foreign judgment problem seems to be
somewhat as follows: A secures a judgment in state X against B.
This gives A a legal right in state X to have the judgment obeyed
by B and imposes a duty upon B to obey it.'
If A subsequently
brings an action against B in state Y, the court is said to "recognize" A's "right" to have the judgment performed and B's "duty"
to perform it." Aside from the constitutional compulsion, this is
the ordinary common law rule. 5 It is none the less true because A
could not have obtained the judgmdnt originally in Y. What actually happens is that A is now giVen a legal right by the law of Y
to have certain acts done and a legal duty is imposed by the law of
Y upon B to perform those acts. The acts are the same that the
law of X required of B when it required him to perform the X
judgment. These same acts are now required in Y, although the law
of Y would not have required such acts of B had the litigation
originally been tried in Y. Why does Y now require the performance of such acts? The reason that induces the Y courts to require
B to perform the acts in question is that an additional fact is presented in the case that could not have existed had the case arisen
originally in Y. That important fact is the X judgment.' 6 A variety of considerations, as everyone knows, conspire to make the X
12Union Planters Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 7r, 47 L. ed. 712 (I9o3);
129 Fed. 792 (i9o3); Brown v. Fletcher, 182 Fed. 963
(igio), cer. denied, 22o U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 6og. See 3 FRUMAN ON JUDGUZNTS 5th ed., sec. 1386.
'sSee i Flt
AN ON JuDmmNTS 5th ed., sec. 5.
"4Restatement, sec. 471.
15The conceptions "right" and "duty" are, of course, merely used to indicate in convenient, conventional language, prophesies of what courts will in fact
do. See Cook, "Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws," 33 YAi
L. J. 457 (1924).
' 6See Cook, "Recognition of Massachusetts Rights by New York Courts."
28 YALZ L. J. 67 (i918). See also GoouaicH, CONFLICT op LAWS, sec. 6.
Bank v. Covington,
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judgment a material, operative fact. Respect for foreign tribunals,
the desirability of limiting the adjudication on its merits to one litigation and the desirability of uniform legal relationships, are all
pressing interests involved. The result is the conflict of laws dogma
that a foreign judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction over the subject of the action and with the parties legally before
the court, will be "recognized" as "conclusive" in every other common law jurisdiction. This aside from any constitutional compulsion
with respect to sister state judgments.
In the present problem, A obtains what purports to be a judgment in X. After the rendition of such an apparent judgment, it is
discovered that certain facts exist in the situation which courts in
X will regard in the future as peculiarly operative facts, namely,
such facts will induce all courts in X to disregard the apparent judgment however and whenever it is brought before the courts and will
induce all X courts to regard it as creating no "right" whatever in
A to have the alleged judgment obeyed and no "duty" whatever
upon B to obey it. At the same time, the Restatement tells us that
the peculiar operative fact which produced this result in state X
and the legal consequences resulting therefrom in X will be completely ignored in state Y, and will not be regarded as significant
there; with the result that courts in Y will compel B to perform
the "duty" supposed to have been imposed upon him by the X judgment and will afford A legal process for compelling the performance
of such "duty" within the limits of common law machinery.
This result seems to be at variance with what ordinarily happens
in analogous situations. In the normal case where a foreign judgment is involved, the court at the forum recognizes it only if it is
valid where rendered.1 7 This produces the desired uniformity. It is
the fact of validity of the judgment where rendered that is the important, operative fact. But what law should determine the original
validity? Obviously the law of the forum where the foreign judgment is introduced.18 The court at such forum is the only court,
by hypothesis, that could determine its validity and the "law" that
it makes is necessarily local law. But that court in forming its judg17See Restatement, sec. 471.
18
Because "recognition" or "enforcement" now depends upon what such
court will do.
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ment will be governed by what it conceives a court would do in the
state where the judgment was first rendered. Since that court will
now repudiate the alleged judgment, the court at the forum will be
expected to repudiate it.
Much the same thing occurs when an X contract is introduced
in Y which, had it been made in Y would not be valid. The Y
court is induced to take certain action requiring B to perform certain
acts. Thus we are led to say that the law of Y imposes a contract
duty upon B and creates a contract right in A."9 Why does the Y
court take such action? Because of the existence of the following
peculiar facts: (i) the transactions in question occurred in X, and
(2) the X law will recognize them as constituting a valid contract.
The effect accorded these facts by Y courts, we describe as the Y
conflict of laws rule.2 0 The analogy here is that the "legal" reason
(not the actual reason, of course) that Y courts create contract
rights in such a case is because there is a "valid" contract in X.
So also, the "reason" that Y courts will create a judgment obligation where the right claimed is based upon an X judgment instead
of an X contract as in the preceding illustration, is because the
judgment is "valid" in X.2'
The same analogy is available, of course, where Y courts create
a Y right arising out of an X tort. In every case, it is the "validity" of the X contract claim, tort claim or judgment claim that induces Y courts to create similar or identical rights in Y and compel
the performance of the respective obligations.
If we say that the validity of the foreign judgment is to be tested
by general common law principles of jurisdiction as understood and
applied at the forum, we are in no different position. Those general principles are fairly well understood and are summarized in the
Restatement as follows :22
2OCf. Cook, "Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws," 33 Y-X
L. J. 457 (I924).
2

LAWS, sec. io3.
The text writers on Judgments are in accord. The law of the state

000omIcH, CONELICT or
21

where the judgment was rendered determines its effect and operation as a
judgment. See BrAcx

oN JUDGm=NTS,
MXNTs, 5th ed., sec. 1387.
22

Sec. 470.

2d ed., sec. 86o; 3 FYMAN

ON JUDG-
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"For the purpose. of this chapter a judgment is valid if it has
the following qualities:
(a) The state in which it was rendered has jurisdiction to act
judicially in the case.
(b) The court which rendered it was competent by the law of
its state to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) It is the formal determination by an impartial court of a
claim made by a party on which reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard were given to all persons to be bound by the
judgment."
In the Pemberton v. Hughes type of case, paragraph (b), supra,
is offended in that the court which rendered the decision was not
competent by the law of its state to adjudicate the matter in controversy. To be sure the law in most states is to the effect that
"a mere error in procedure" does not affect the competency of a
court to render judgment. But in Pemberton v. Hughes the law of
Florida made such an "error in procedure" a matter which rendered
the Florida court incompetent to exercise judicial power in the controversy. This is necessarily so. By hypothesis in the common law,
an "invalid" judgment is one which was rendered by a court which
did not have jurisdiction to render it. By declarirg the divorce involved in Pemberton v. Hughes "invalid," the law of Florida prescribed ten clear days notice as a condition precedent to the rendition
of a valid judgment, and such a condition, by definition, became by
Florida law a "jurisdictional" matter.
AUTHORITY AND PRINCIPLI-"JURISDICTIONAL" DvmiCTs

So far as can be discovered, a "jurisdictional" defect within common law meaning, is such a defect as will induce a common law
court to regard the ensuing or subsequent action of the court as
"non-judicial" and consequently not binding as an adjudication. To
say that a judgment is "invalid" is merely another way of saying
that it was rendered by a body that was incapable of acting judicially in the premises. Both propositions merely describe certain
consequences to be attached to the action of the court. And what
are those consequences? Merely these: other common law courts
(and, presumably, the same court) upon discovery of the "invalidating" fact or the fact which renders the first court "incompetent" will
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act in a certain definite way, viz., they will disregard the "judgment"
as operative to determine legal relations. This is the sole meaning
in common law parlance of an "invalid" judgment. Another way
of stating the same thing is to say .hat the action of the former
court may be "collaterally" attacked, whenever and however it may
be relied upon as the determination of legal relations.
It is, of course, only a trick of language or of Aristotelian
thought to state the foregoing propositions in the form of a syllogism. It may be said that the judgment of a court which is not
"competent" to act in the premises is "invalid" because of the incompetency and it is subject to collateral attack because it is "invalid."
Getting at the result of "collateral attack" in this manner does not
alter the proposition at all, for the result was, of course, necessarily implied in the premise; otherwise the result would be a non
sequitur.28 But are "invalid judgments" the only ones that are subject to collateral attack? May not "valid" judgments, rendered by
courts that are "competent" also -sometimes be subject to collateral
attack? It is submitted that they are not, at common law. No case
has been discovered that sustains a collateral attack upon any grounds
other than the ground that the judgment was "invalid" in the sense
that it had been rendered by a court which was not competent to act
judicially in the matter. An apparent exception to this rule under
modern statutes is the situation which allows an equitable defense to
an action on a judgment. Such a case might arise in two ways, an
"equitable defense" might be interposed in a suit upon a judgment
in the state where it was rendered or it might be so interposed in
a foreign state. If it has become a legal defense under the so-called
equitable defense statute, 24 the result is merely to establish another
jurisdictional requirement and permit an attack upon the judgment
on the grounds that the court rendering it was not competent to
render the particular judgment in question.
The court, in Levin v. Gladstone,25 and similar cases, 26 has adopted the modem, pragmatic view of equity decrees that they consti2sCf. Dewey, "Logical Theory in Law," io Co"n. L. Q. 17,
24

See Hinton, "Equitable Defenses Under Modern Codes,"

23 (1925).

g ficH. L.

RIv. 7,7 (92o).
2542 N. C. 482, 55 S.E. 371 (9o6).
2

cited.

0See Shary v. Eszlinger, 45 N. D. 133, I76 N.W. 938 (i92o) and cases
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tute judicial action in the same sense as do judgments at law.2 7
Such decisions simply attribute to a rule of equity-law the same
force that is attributed to a rule of common law. Since equity will
enjoin the enforcement of the "judgment," the result should be either
in equity or law, if the question can be got before the court under
the procedural apparatus available, that the judgment is without force
as an adjudication of legal relations. The defect which would induce an equity court to refuse efficacy to the "judgment," is now
sufficient to produce substantially the same result in a court of law.
To be sure, this can all be explained by the historical conception of
the nature of "equity." But the result is equally intelligible, and
more in accord with the facts, by regarding the "defect," once cognizable only by equity but now an operative fact at common law,
as a "jurisdictional defect." We are thus enabled to recognize the
identity of the ideas incorporated in the various formulae "collateral
attack," "incompetency" of the court, and "invalidity" of the judgment.
Now the cases disclose that there are several rather common categories of defects which will render a court "incompetent" and its
judgment therefore "non-judicial" (invalid). These may bh-briefly
referred to as follows:
(i)
If the judgment is a personal judgment, the parties must
be before the court. A party is not legally before the court if there
is a failure of either of the following conditions precedent: (a) reasonable notice and (b) a reasonable opportunity to be heard. For
purposes of the preient discussion it is not necessary to elaborate
this requirement.
(2)
If the state did not have jurisdiction, in the international
sense, to act upon the subject matter of the action. 28 For purposes
of the present discussion it is not necessary to detail the principles
which govern jurisdiction in the international sense.
(3) Even if the state did have jurisdiction to act, in the international sense, and the parties were legally before the court, there
is a jurisdictional defect if the authority which created the court
(either constitutional or legislative) limited its competency to certain
27

See Cook, "Powers of Courts of Equity," I5 CoL. L. Rxv. 37, io6, 228

(i1m).
28See GoODRICH, CONrIICT or

LAws, sec. 65 and authorities cited.
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types of cases, and the court renders a judgment beyond the limitations imposed. The court can act judicially in only those types of
cases. 29 The limitation may be by specific legislative restriction or
it may be imposed by the meaning ascribed to general terms by common law usage. An example of the specific restriction is a provision creating tribunals for special purposes only such as workmen's
compensation boards, industrial commissions, etc. An example of the
general limitation is to be found in the creation of courts of "general jurisdiction," or "common law" courts, or courts with "jurisdiction at common law and equity." The measure of the power of such
courts is to be found in the general competency of common law
courts and chancery courts of England to determine certain types of
controversies. 0
(4) If there is a specific statutory limitation upon certain classes
of judgments, going to the amount, nature or extent of the judgment or decree, then the court is competent to render a judgment
or decree only within the limitations thus imposed.3 1 An example of
this type of limitation is the jurisdictional amounts of claims brought
in the federal courts or in justice courts or muncipal courts.
(5) If the legislature prescribes any further conditions precedent to a court acting judicially in a particular controversy, then such
conditions are necessary to the competency of the court to render the
particular judgment or decree.
The situation in question falls within the fifth classification.
What requirements laid down by the legislature are actually conditions precedent to a court acting judicially ar&, of course, matters
of interpretation. Each state may determine for itself what conditions precedent shall exist as requirements of the competency of its
courts. Each state may determine for itself what special jurisdic29

See Restatement, sec. 47o, Comment and Special Note to clause (b).
3OSee McQuigan v. Delaware etc. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N.E. 235

(1891).
31See Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill.
140, 133 N.E. 58 (1921) : "The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide
every question which arises in the cause, and to judgment or decree, however
erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case
belongs and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment
or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it." See also Smayne, J.,
in Ex Parte Reed, ioo U. S. 13, 23 (1879).
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tional requirements are imposed upon its courts by its legislature.
Many conditions prescribed by the legislature are construed as not
necessarily conditions precedent to the courts' competency. They are
"merely procedural" or "mere rules of decision." "Procedure" or
"substance" as used in this sense, is to be distinguished from "jurisdictional." A statute "merely procedural" is a statute that is "not
substantive" and "not jurisdictional." The loose term "procedure"
is employed to denote certain other characteristics, but in the present problem courts clearly employ the term to refer to a requirement
that is not fatal to the power of the court to act judicially. Accordingly, the black-letter type of the Restatement is quite consistent with
this distinction. A "procedural error" is necessarily one that will not
invalidate the ensuing judgment. But the comment and illustration
which follow the black-letter type is inconsistent with the distinction
for the obvious reason that the very fact that the Florida court will
treat the divorce decree involved in Pemberton v. Hughes as void,
demonstrates that the Florida courts construe the statute as not a
"mere procedural direction," but as a rule of jurisdiction, one that
establishes a condition to the competency of courts to decree divorces.
Certainly the English court in Pemberton v. Hughes would not
claim the right (power) to determine what is and what is not a
jurisdictional defect in Florida so long as the state had jurisdiction
in the international sense. And yet to hold the Florida divorce a
"valid" decree, when the Florida courts hold otherwise, constitutes
that a very presumptuous claim. The Florida legislature has enacted
a statute requiring a given period between service and decree. The
Florida courts construe that statute as one that must be obeyed before a court can render a binding decree. The English court holds
that it need not be so obeyed. An ensuing decree is "valid" without compliance with the statute. This is not what ordinarily happens when a Florida statute is construed. If the question is whether
a Florida statute of limitations is a limitation only upon the remedy
(procedural) or a restriction upon the right (substantive), that construction will be binding everywhere.3 2 If the question is whether
a Florida statute of frauds is a procedural or a substantive enactment, that construction will prevail in all common law jurisdictions.3 3
32See Restatement, sec. 633.
83See Restatement, see. 630, Comment (a), with which cf. Restatement,
sec. 355, Comment (b).
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So also should be Florida's construction of a local statute that it is
neither "procedural" nor "substantive," but is a limitation upon the
power of its courts to act judicially in a given case.
The mistake made by the English court in Pemberton v. Hughes
was in the significance to be attached to the common law jurisdiction of Florida (i.e. jurisdiction in the international sense). The
English judges argued that if Florida had such jurisdiction, the judgment should be recognized in England and English courts would not
inquire how Florida "exercised" such jurisdiction. This completely
begs the question. The question is whether Florida has exercised
such jurisdiction. According to the law of Florida, no judicial power
has been exercised at all. This should determine the case for English courts. The proposition which should have been laid down in
Pemberton v. Hughes is that if Florida had common law jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction in the international sense) Florida law would
be conclusiv'e as to when such jurisdiction had been exercised, and
English courts would not inquire into the propriety or wisdom of
any conditions precodent to the exercise thereof by its courts.
There is light on the doctrine of Pemberton v. Hughes in the
case of Thompson v. Whitman."4 In this case a New Jersey sheriff
was sued in New York for seizing plaintiff's sloop.. The defendant
pleaded a forfeiture after a hearing and judgment by a New Jersey
court under a New Jersey statute providing for the forfeiture of a
vessel employed in raking clams in the waters of the state after a
hearing before the justices of the county in which the seizure was
made. The defendant produced a record of the New Jersey proceeding certifying that the offense had been committed and the seizure made within the county of Monmouth. The New York jury
found specially (i) that the seizure was made within the state of
New Jersey; (2) that it was not made in the county of Monmouth.
Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed this judgment, holding that the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court could be attacked on the grounds that
the judgment was not rendered by the justices of the county in
which the sloop had been seized. It is clear here that the New
Jersey justices under the statute had jurisdiction only to declare a
8418

Wall.

457, 21

L. ed. 897 (1873).

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

forfeiture of vessels seized within their respective counties. Consequently, plaintiff's vessel, having been seized in one county and forfeited by a proceeding in another, had been sold under a void
judgment that could be attacked collaterally in New Jersey and elsewhere. There is no fundamental difference between the kind of defect which invalidated this New Jersey judgment and the defective
divorce decree involved in Pemberton v. Hughes. The Florida courts
were empowered by Florida statutes to render divorce decrees. The
New Jersey justices were empowered to declare the forfeiture of
vessels seized while raking clams. In both states, however, statutes
prescribed certain conditions precedent to the courts' power to act
in a particular case. The condition precedent in the Florida situation was the ten clear days notice. The condition precedent in the
New Jersey case was the seizure of the vessel within the county.
If either condition was not complied with, the court had no power
to render a decree in a particular case.
It will not do to argue that the limitations upon the courts' power
to act in these respective states are distinguishable. Such an argument could be made only by injecting an ambiguity into the phrase
"type of case." This is accomplished, of course, by arguing that the
Florida courts had authority under the Florida liw to act in the
"type of case" involved, since the category of cases involved is the
general one-divorce cases; while the New Jersey justices did not
have power under the New Jersey law to act in the "type of case"
there involved,--namely forfeiture of sloops seized outside the county. Both courts were courts of special and limited jurisdiction. Each
court was empowered to act in such cases only' as the statutes authorized. The New Jersey statute was interpreted to limit the power
of the New Jersey justices to act judicially only with respect to sloops
seized within their county. The Florida statute limited the power
of the Florida divorce courts to act judicially only with respect to
divorce actions preceded by the ten clear days notice. Statutes in
both states were regarded in their respective states as jurisdictional
and judgments rendered contrary thereto as void. The conflict of
laws requires that such judgments be regarded in the same manner
in every other common law jurisdiction.
Another possible but dubious distinction mighi be based upon the
fact that the requirement in Florida for the ten clear days notice
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is found in a separate section of the statutes whereas the limitations
upon the power of the New Jersey justices is to be found in the
statute which prohibits the raking of clams and confers jurisdiction
upon the justices to declare a forfeiture. But the Florida requirement is found in the section on "divorces" where the power of the
court to decree divorces is found and it would seem to be a flimsy
distinction to hold that if such requirement for ten clear days had
been included as a subsection or subordinate clause of a previous
section of the same chapter, it would constitute a "jurisdictional" requirement, but when included in a separate section of the chapter,
it is not "jurisdictional." Such a ratio decidendi accords too much
significance to the accident of legislature draftsmanship and certainly
too subtle a process of thinking to the legislator.
To be sure, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Whitman decided only that New York was not required by the Constitution to
recognize the New Jersey judgment. But the reasoning of the court
proceeds from its assumption that the requirement imposed by the
New Jersey statute and violated in the decree of forfeiture was a
jurisdictional requirement. There is no ground whatever for assuming that the New York court would have been permitted to recognize such a defective foreign decree. Indeed, as pointed out later,
the cases seem to indicate clearly that there would have been a vioiation of the full faith and credit rule had New York recognized
such a decree-and perhaps of the due process clause as well. In
any event, the New York decision, from which the appeal was taken,
is, if the cases are similar as contended here, an application of a
conflict of laws ruie contrary to that of Pemzberton v. Hughes.
In Indiana, a statute makes the lapse of time between service and
decree a condition precedent to the power of a court to render the
divorce."' It provides: "The trial of no cause for absolute or limited divorce shall be had or heard by any court until after the expiration of sixty days from the date of the issue of such summons as
shall have been duly served on the defendant spouse or from the
date of publication of the first notice of a nonresident defendant.
Any trial had or decree rendered in any such case in less than sixty
days shall be null and void." This statute was clearly intended to
35Burns Ind. Stat., 1926, sec. iLO4.
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be a limitation upon the power of a court to render a decree and is
thus properly a "jurisdictional statute." It is difficult to see how a
decree rendered by an Indiana court in defiance of this limitation
could be regarded as a "valid" decree in any common law jurisdiction. And yet the construction placed upon the Florida statute by
the Florida courts produces the same result as if the statutes were
identical.
Similar situations arise under workmen's compensation statutes
requiring a bona fide attempt on the part of the injured employee
and his employer to come to an agreement as to compensation. In
some states, the provision for an attempt at agreement is construed
as jurisdictional and a condition precedent, not to the plaintiff's right
of action, but to the power of the Industrial Board to hear and determine the controversy."8 So also, under the Illinois statute, the
provision that the injured employee must claim compensation within
six months is construed as a condition precedent to the jurisdiction
of the Board. In Bushwell v. Industrial Board,7 the court said:
"The making of a claim for compensation is jurisdictional and a condition precedent to the right to maintain such action, and the burden of proof was upon the claimant to establish such fact as a proof
of his case in chief, and in the absence of such prcof the committee
of arbitration and the Industrial Board were without jurisdiction to
proceed in the matter." No one would argue that an award, in violation of such a requirement, though it were void at home, would
be recognized as valid in any other state. Such A construction was
precisely the one placed upon the Florida statute in the problem
at hand.
So far as the proposition that the law (rule) of the state which
rendered the judgment determines, as a matter of conflict of laws,
what effect, if any, is to be accorded the judgment, there are American cases in point. While the number of such cases is not large,
the judges seem to have little difficulty with the problem. They regard it too clear to be seriously questioned. Thus in Wood v. Watkinson,38 in which the Connecticut court held that the New York
3

6Re Moore, 79 Ind. App. 470, 138 N.E. 783 (1923).

I11. 262, H4 N.E. 492. See also Re Levangie, 228 Mass.
N.E. 200 (19,7).
3s,7 Conn. 5oo, 44 Am. Dec. 562, 565 (1846).
37276
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rule should control the effect of a New York judgment against joint
debtors, it was said: "* * * it is well settled, that no greater effect
is to be given to it than it would have in the state where it was
rendered. It has no higher dignity in any other state than in the
one where it was pronounced; and hence, if in the courts of the
state where the judgment was rendered, it is inconclusive, or if
it is inquirable into there, during a particular period, or on certain conditions, it will be open to investigation, to the same extent
everywhere else; * ** A judgment creates a debt, on the ground
that a liability is ascertained and established, by the decision of a
tribunal, which might rightfully adjudicate upon it; and such adjudication derives its whole force and effect from the laws of the state
under whose authority it is made."
Again in Sugdam v. Barbers9 it was held that a Missouri judgment against one of two joint debtors was not a bar to liability on
the part of the other in New York because the effect of the Missouri judgment in that state did not merge the cause of action upon
which it was founded, although such a merger would be effected
by a New York judgment. The court observed that "the consequences of a judgment, in respect to its effect as a merger or extinguishment of the original demand, are a part of the law under which
the judgment itself is rendered, just as much as are those other
common consequences of judgments, that a party may have execution upon them, and that they are not re-examinable on the merits
of the controversy determined by them.'

40

That any other rule than that the effect accorded the judgment
where rendered should control, appears out of the question to the
court is clearly noted in other language employed: "No case can
be found where a greater effect is given to the judgment of any
state in the courts of another than belongs to it in thle state where
it was rendered. Indeed, such a rule would be against all reason,
and not only out of the policy of the provisions of the Constitution
and laws of the United States on the subject, but against and irreconcilable with all policy, and with the plainest and fundamental principles of justice."'"
8918 N. Y. 468, 75 Am. Dec. 254 (858).
4018 N. Y. 468, 471.

4118 N. Y. 468, 472. See also Calloway v. Glenn, io5 Ky. 648, 49 S.W. 440.
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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPIICATIONS INVOLVED

The situation presented by incorporating the doctrine of Pemberton v. Hughes into American law raises some nice constitutional
problems. The Restatement, while asserting the Florida divorce decree to be "valid" in all sister states, declares that the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution does not require such recognition.
This is unusual. le seems clear that ordinarily a judgment rendered by a competent court, that is, a court which had jurisdiction
in every sense, is within the full faith and credit clause protection.
It can not be collaterally attacked in a sister state. This is because
it can not be collaterally attacked at home. Apparently the implication which has been read into the full faith and credit clause is that
it merely establishes a minimum of "credit" to be attached to foreign judgments-they are entitled, not to the same credit but "at
least to the same" credit as where rendered. The implication is that
the Constitution does not forbid more credit to a judgment than it
42
is entitled to in the state where rendered.
This is a possible construction, but it is submitted that there are
no cases to support the implication. Professor Beale has succeeded
in demolishing the one situation which tended to support such a construction of the full faith and credit clause. That situation was the
one created by the Haddock decision.48 In that case, it will be remembered, the Supreme Court held it unnecessary for New York to
recognize a Connecticut divorce decree rendered in favor of a resident of Connecticut and against a resident of New York, New York
being the matrimonial domicil of the parties. It was supposed, after
this decision, that here was a situation in which one state could,
but need not, recognize the judgment of a sister state, although the
sister state had jurisdiction to render the judgment." The Constitution did not require -recognition of the judgment in sister states,
although it would not prevent such a recognition if the sister state,
under its conflict of laws rule, saw fit to recognize it. This view
is still supported by eminent authority.4 5 It is not now the view of
42

0r that sometimes a state may employ its discretion as to recognition of
a foreign judgment.
4820i U. S. 562, 5o L. ed. 867 (igo6).
44
See Beale, "Constitutional Protection of Decrees of Divorce," i9 HARv.
L. Rzv. s86 (igo6).
5
oi LAws, p. 295.
' GooDmcH, CoNrx,Ic
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Professor Beale, however. He argued that the reason New York was
not required to recognize the Connecticut decree was because Connecticut had no jurisdiction to render the decree, and therefore the
decree was invalid, even in Connecticut. 4 This is an attractive explanation of the Haddock case and, although it required a certain
defiance of the dicta of that case, it has, it seems, run afoul of no
47
actual decisions. This view has been adopted in the Restatement.
It is believed that the doctrine, as thus worked out, is a thoroughly sound one and that it is in accord with the cases. But it
shatters the construction of the full faith and credit clause that is
necessary to support the doctrine of Pemberton v. Hughes in the
United States. So far as the divorce cases are concerned, there is
no support for the proposition that one state may accord more faith
and credit to a sister state judgment than it receives in any other
state, or that there may be situations in which a court may, but need
not, recognize a sister state judgment.
On the other hand, there is some authority to the effect that the
Constitution and the Act of Congress require exactly the same effect
to a sister state judgment as such judgments receive at home-no
less effect, and no more. The statute provides that sister state judgments "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United.States as they have by law or usage in the courts
of the State from which they are taken."''1

It might be supposed

that "such" faith and credit would imply the "same" faith and credit,
thus precluding a sister state from according more effect thereto.
Certainly this was the view of Chief Justice Marshall. In Hampton v. M'Connel 9 he said that "the judgment of a state court shall
have the same credit validity and effect in every other court in the
United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced,
and whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state
and none other, could be pleaded in any other court in the United
States.' 50
"8 Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 HARV. L. Rsv. 417 (z926).
47Restatement, sec. 118.
48U. S. C. A., tit. 2S, sec. 687.
493 Wheat. 234, 235 (1818).
6OA sister state judgment is "open to the same attacks and subject to the
same defenses which may be made in the state of its rendition." 3 FREMcAN
ON JUDGMENTS,

5th ed., sec. 1386.

See Gundlock v. Park, i4o Minn. 78, i65

N.W. o69; Shary v. Eszlinger, 45 N. D. i33, 176 N.W. 938 (i92o).
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While the point actually decided in Hampton v. M'Connel was

not whether a state might accord greater effect to a judgment of
a sister state than it receives at home, the opinion of the Chief Justice clearly was that such effect could not be given. There are, however, cases which actually so hold, construing the full faith and
credit clause rule to prescribe a maximum as well as a minimum
effect to a sister state judgment. Board of Public Works v. Columbha College 1 was an appeal from the supreme court of the District
of Columbia. It was a suit in equity to reach property belonging
to the estate of a deceased debtor, particularly funds distributed to
legatees, including Columbia College. The question arose whether,
to establish grounds for the interposition of equity, complainant had
proceeded far enough at law to establish an undisputed debt. A
decree had been rendered in complainant's favor in Virginia, but the
court of appeals of that state had characterized the decree as interlocutory and not final. Said Mr. Justice Field:
"At any rate, the coinplainant, relying upon the decree of the
court (Virginia decree) as evidence of his demand against Withers
(the deceased), invoking for it full faith and credit under the clause
of the Constitution, can not object to the character which the highest court of Virginia has given to it, or insist that it is entitled to
any other weight or consideration. No greater effect can be given
to any judgment of a court of one State in another State than is
given to it in the State where rendered. Any other rule would contravene the policy of the provisions of the Constitution and laws of
the United States on the subject."
It is to be noticed that this case was not an appeal from a state
decision, in which case it would merely be authority for the proposition that the state need not accord conclusive effect to the Virginia
decree. Being an appeal from a federal court, on the merits of
the decree, as an equity decree, it might be argued that, although
it involves an interpretation of the full faith and credit clause and
the Act of Congress, it does so only as a conflict of laws rule for
federal courts. It is not a very plausible suggestion, however, that
the Constitution and statute prescribe one conflict of laws rule, and
a different constitutional rule with respect to sister state judgments.
The case therefore stands as a decision forbidding a state to lend
51I7 Wall. 521

(873).
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more force to a sister state judgment than it is accorded in the state
where rendered.
In Bruce v. Ackroyd, 2 it was held that a record not entitled to
recognition in New York as a judgment of that state, was not entitled to such recognition in Connecticut. The court said:
"There can be no doubt but that any state may determine for
itself what are the essentials of a judgment of record in its own
courts. If the record discloses such essentials as to entitle it to recognition as a judgment in a domestic court it is, under the United
States Constitution and the statute, entitled to the same recognition
in the courts of other states. [Citing cases.] Conversely, it must follow that if the domestic courts would not recognize the record as
establishing a judgment, it can not be given that effect in any other
state. The law of the state in which the judgment is rendered governs, and not the law of the other state in which the record is sought
to be used to establish the fact of a judgment in the original jurisdiction."
But there is still another angle to the constitutional problem, the
one created by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is usually said that
when a state exercises power over a person or his property when it
had no jurisdiction there is taking of liberty or property without
due process of law. This rule has been generalized in the Restatement to include all cases where a state exercises power when it
wanted jurisdiction. 5 If the contention made here is sound, namely
that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction to render the divorce
decree involved in Pemberton v. Hughes, a serious question is raised
as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment will not prevent a foreign
state from recognizing the decree. Upon this, no opinion is ventured, but a possible knotty problem is involved. It may be that the
failure of jurisdiction that will invoke the protection of the due process clause must be jurisdiction in the international sense alone and
that the Constitution would not touch a failure of the state to properly exercise that jurisdiction through a properly authorized tribunal.
Again, the due process clause might afford protection only in the
See also Sugdam v. Barber, I8 N. Y.
5295 Conn. 167, no Ad. 835 (92o).
468, 75 Am. Dec. 254 (1858). 3 FAMAN ON JUDGmXNTS 5th ed., sec. 1387.
See SroR ON rH4 CONSTITUTION, 5th ed., sec. 313.
53
Restatement, sec. 44.
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state which wanted jurisdiction in the international sense, and not
in other states when no question of jurisdiction there is involved."
For example, the due process clause might have protected Mrs. Haddock in Connecticut against the Connecticut divorce decree, but still
not operate to prevent New York from recognizing the Connecticut
decree if it saw fit to do so."
As to the first doubt, while it seems unnecessary to press the
point, so far as the present problem is concerned, in view of the
disposition of the case under the full faith and credit clause rule,
nevertheless it is significant that many iimes the Supreme Court has
used language that clearly indicates that the failure of jurisdiction
of a court, in the internal sense, renders such a judgment void under
the due process clause even though the state had jurisdiction of the
person and subject matter, in the international sense, 8 and there are
57
several lower court cases that have directly so held.
CONCLUSIONS

In attempting to demonstrate the invalidity of the Pemberton v.
Hughes doctrine, as incorporated in the Restatement, the conception
of "jurisdiction" is used in its broadest sense. Some circumstances
incident to the judicial process are such as to induce all common
law courts to recognize the first court's action as a "valid" judgment. Other circumstances are such as to induce all common law
courts to ignore the first court's action and treat it as void. In the
first instance, the result may be described by saying that the court
had "jurisdiction"; in the second instance, it did not have "juris54
See
55

Restatement 44, Comment (c) (tentative draft).
1t is believed that the full faith and credit clause would prevent New
York from recognizing the Connecticut decree, if the foregoing analysis is
sound and if section zI8 of the Restatement is sound.
5
and a judg6See Gray, J., in Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 46: ***
ment is wholly void, if a fact essential to the jurisdiction of the court did not
exist." And see Field, J, in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733: "To give
such proceedings (i.e. legal proceedings) any validity, there must be a tribunal
competent by its constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon
the subject matter of the suit * * *." See also Harlan, 3., in Old Wayne
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 2o4 U. S. 8, x5 (907).
5T
(habeas corpus, where one convicted by
Re Kelly, 46 Fed. 643 (89o)
justice for an offense not committed within the county) ; Re Monroe, 46 Fed.
52 (i8gi) (habeas corpus, where one sentenced by police magistrate in excess
of authority conferred by statute.)
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diction." Thus any particular defect in the judicial process that will
induce other common law courts to ignore the first court's action is
a "jurisdictional defect." This principle, together with orthodox results and analogies in the conflict of laws leads to a repudiation of
the doctrine of the English decision.
It is submitted, therefore, that the doctrine of Pemberton v.
Hughes is not the law in America, if we mean by stating that a
given doctrine "is the law" that the probabilities are reasonably persuasive that courts, when the occasion arises, will decide cases in a
way that is consistent with the doctrine in question. The probabilities seem to suggest strongly that courts in this country will decide
cases exactly contrary to Pemberton v. Hughes, in so far as prediction may rest upon authority, logic, and utility of result.
The generalization that "mere errors in procedure" prior to judgment does not render a judgment subject to attack in a sister state,
contained in the black-letter type of the Restatement, is thoroughly
sound. But the explanatory comment and illustration, including the
Pemberton v. Hughes case, is incorrect. If such illustration is supposed to interpret the black-letter type (which it does not), it renders the entire section erroneous. If it does not explain or illustrate
the black-letter type (which seems to be the case) it should be withdrawn. In any event, whatever portion of the Restatement that is
supposed to incorporate the English decision, it is submitted with
deference to the eminent scholars who have drafted the work, is an
erroneous statement of the law of this country.
From the conclusions here arrived at, it would seem that the
comment and illustration of the Restatement might properly be replaced by some such proposition as follows:
The state where the judgment was rendered determines what are
"mere procedural errors" and what errors render its courts incompetent to act judicially in a particular case or class of cases.

